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Abstract
This study examines the gender wage gap in the USA using two separate cross-sections
from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The extensive literature on this subject
includes wage decompositions that divide the gender wage gap into “explained” and
“unexplained” components. One of the problems with this approach is the heteroge-
neity of the sample data. In order to address the difficulties of comparing like with like,
this study uses a number of different matching techniques to obtain estimates of the
gap. By controlling for a wide range of other influences, in effect, we estimate the direct
effect of simply being female on wages. However, a number of other factors, such as
parenthood, gender segregation, part-time working, and unionization, contribute to the
gender wage gap. This means that it is not just the core “like for like” comparison
between male and female wages that matters but also how gender wage differences
interact with other influences. The literature has noted the existence of these interac-
tions, but precise or systematic estimates of such effects remain scarce. The most
innovative contribution of this study is to do that. Our findings imply that the idea of
a single uniform gender pay gap is perhaps less useful than an understanding of how
gender wages are shaped by multiple different forces.
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1 Introduction
This study estimates the gender pay gap in the USA using several different matching
estimators. We first justify the use of matching estimators by using an Oaxaca recentered
influence function (RIF) model to estimate the gender pay gap. Other authors using a
similar approach have found the “unexplained” component of the gender pay gap to be
high. Some of these, including Kassenboehmer and Sinning (2014) and Töpfer (2017),
attribute this to heterogeneity within their sample. A similar analysis in this study also
finds a high “unexplained” component, which implies a heterogeneity problem.
Where heterogeneity is an issue, a well-established approach is to use a matching
estimator—see, for example, Ñopo (2008). This study therefore relies on several matching
estimators for its core analysis. These are discussed from the methodological perspective
later, but matching involves a number of conceptual issues which are central to the
approach of this study. A matching approach creates a control group (of males) which,
as far as possible, matches the treated group (female) in all relevant characteristics. For the
estimator not to be biased, relevant characteristics such as part-time working and union
membership must be included as covariates. The result is an estimate of the gap between
male and female pay that controls for all relevant observable characteristics, including
unionization and part-time work. Estimating a pure “gender” effect on wages is one of the
advantages of using amatching estimator, but the process of creating a control group omits
other more indirect ways by which women are paid less.
For example, working part-time typically involves a substantially lower hourly rate of
pay than working full-time, as this study confirms. A much higher proportion of females
work part-time than do males. Likewise, unionized workers exhibit significantly higher
hourly pay than non-unionized workers, and females are much less likely to be unionized
than males. A matching approach is intended to capture the effect on wages of being
female and needs to control for overlapping effects like part-time work or union mem-
bership. Methodologically this is sound, but it must be properly understood that there is
more to thematter. In terms of hourly pay, females are also disadvantaged by, say, working
part-time and being less likely to be unionized. It is proper to ignore such effects in a
matching estimate of the pure “gender effect,” but this study emphasizes that such
estimates do not capture the full extent of the wage disadvantages faced by females.
Themain focus of this study is, within amatching framework, to examine the important
interactions between gender and other relevant characteristics. Union membership and
part-time work are two of these. The study also considers the effects of parenthood, age,
and gender segregation. An important part of the approach taken is the inverse probability
weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) matching estimator. There are important statis-
tical advantages from using an IPWRA estimator (mainly its “double robustness” prop-
erty), but the key reason for using IPWRA is behavioral more than statistical. The IPWRA
estimator can work with two treatment effects and hence estimate the effects of interac-
tions between gender and another variable. For example, consider female and part-time as
treatment variables. The IPWRA approach can simultaneously give the following treat-
ment effects on hourly wages: (a) being female, (b) working part time, and (c) both being
female and working part time (an interaction effect).
The conceptual relevance of these interactions is not new in the literature, as Blau and
Kahn (2017) make clear, but such interaction effects have not previously been formally
estimated in a consistent manner, if at all. The contribution of the paper is to provide
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clear evidence that a basic matching estimate of the gender pay gap is useful but does not
tell the whole story. An analysis which includes not just a “gender only” effect on wages
but also interactions between this gender effect and other key covariates (such as part-
time work) is a much richer one. This is the main contribution of the study.
Section 2 provides a review of the literature. The data used by the study, which are
two samples taken from the US Current Population Survey (CPS) for the period
October 2011 to March 2012 and for the period October 2017 to March 2018, are
described in Section 3, and the methodological approach is described in Section 4. The
matching analysis with a single treatment effect is presented in Section 5 and the
IPWRA analysis in Section 6. Section 7 presents the conclusions of the study.
2 Review of literature
Blau and Kahn (2017) present a comprehensive review of what is now an extensive
literature on the gender pay gap in the USA. A number of themes arising in this
literature are developed further in this paper. Blau and Kahn (2017) present detailed
empirical evidence to show that some of the core issues have changed since the 1970s.
Several of these are of particular relevance for this paper. Firstly, the gender wage gap
has fallen dramatically but still remains sizeable. This is perhaps surprising given that
the gap in education has been reversed in favor of women. They find that the gender
wage gap has fallen from about 36–38% in 1970 to between 18 and 21% in 2010. The
analysis presented in this study does not consider long-term changes but does confirm
that a substantial wage gap remains.
In their meta-analysis of a total of 263 papers, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer
(2005) also find evidence of a global reduction of the gender wage gap. At the same
time that the gender wage gap was narrowing, the human capital factors used to explain
the gap (education and actual work experience) were either moving in favor of women
or strongly declining. Beaudry and Lewis (2014) associate the declining gender wage
gap in the USA with changes in the price of skills, related to skill-biased technical
change. In another US study, Borghans et al. (2014) find the decline in the gender wage
gap to be associated with a growth in the importance of people skills. In a rare natural
experiment, Flory et al. (2014) link the gap in gender wages to female aversion to
competitive work environments.
Blau and Kahn (2017) report that the gender gap in years of education has reversed
from − 0.2 to + 0.2 between 1981 and 2011 for the USA. The gap in years of work
experience fell from 7 in 1981 to 1.4 years in 2011. In consequence, the role of these
traditional factors in the gender wage gap has shrunk. Together, education and work
experience explained about 27% of the gap in 1981 but only around 8% in 2010. A
number of other explanatory factors have also reduced in significance, such as the effect of
unionization on male wages. Despite this decline, the evidence presented in this study
shows that unionization still plays a part in gender wage differences. Blau and Kahn
(2017) show that, in contrast, some other factors have become increasingly important. For
example, they find that gender segregation by occupation and industry has become of
much greater consequence—accounting for only about 27% of the gap in 1980 but about
49% in 2010. The role of gender segregation is another theme which this study seeks to
develop further.
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The link between gender segregation and the gender wage gap has long since been
made. Polachek (1981) constructs a model in which female earnings potential depreciates
during temporary exits from the labor force while males remaining in the labor force see
their earnings potential appreciate from continued skill development. The expectation of
interruptions to work experience affects female investment in skills and, hence, occupa-
tional choice.Maternity drives women to self-segregate into jobs which are less innovative
and less skill driven—occupations that tend to be paid less. Cobb-Clark and Moschion
(2017) provide evidence from Australia that gender differences in educational perfor-
mance exist at an early stage and vary according to socio-economic status.
A number of studies have tried to assess the extent of occupational segregation in the
USA and elsewhere by means of the Duncan and Duncan (1955) segregation index.
Blau and Kahn (2013a, b) find that the segregation index fell from 64.5 in 1970 to 51.0
in 2009. The decline was more rapid in the 1970s than in the 1980s and even more
gradual in the following years. As Blau and Kahn (2017) note, even the diminished
value of 51% still represents a high degree of occupational segregation. Unsurprisingly
(given the known role that segregation has in explaining the gender wage gap), the high
value of the segregation index relative to 2009 confirms that occupational and industry
differences by gender still remain sizeable. This study also reports gender segregation
indices for the USA with similar findings.
Hegewisch et al. (2010) find similar evidence of a declining degree of segregation in
the USA. Moreover, they link gender segregation to the gender wage gap, finding a
negative relationship between the share of women in employment in an occupation and
the gender wage gap. Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs (2002) also link gender segre-
gation to the gender wage gap, finding further evidence of the role of industries as a
source of wage inequality. Levanon et al. (2009) consider the view that gender
segregation and the gender wage gap are causally related by two sociological
processes—devaluation and queuing—using US Census data. Their analysis found
some evidence of devaluation (valuing the work of females less) but little evidence of
queuing (employers preferring to hire males).
Other studies drew similar conclusions to the USA for other countries. For instance,
Barón and Cobb-Clark (2010) find an important effect of occupational segregation on the
gender wage gap in Australia. They find the gender wage gap to be fully explained by
productivity characteristics but not fully explained for high-wage workers. Olsen and
Walby (2004) find evidence from the UK that labor market rigidities—including the
segregation of women into certain occupations and into smaller, non-unionized firms—
were responsible for about 36% of the gender wage gap.Walby andOlsen (2002) also find
both occupational and industrial segregation to have been prevalent in the UK. Livanos
and Pouliakas (2012), in a study of Greece, find that gender segregation with respect to
educational subject explained part of the gender wage gap. Pastore and Verashchagina
(2011) find that the gender wage gap more than doubled during the transition from plan to
market in Belarus, particularly because women have experienced increasing segregation
in low-wage industries.
Polachek (1985) further extends this link between gender wages and a life cycle
view of occupational choice. Polachek (2014) finds the gender pay gap to be smaller
between single men and women and larger between married men and women. This is
attributable to his life cycle model of human capital and the resulting different
occupational structures between the genders. To the extent that educational choices
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by women are related to eventual occupational choices, the study of Danish labor
markets by Humlum et al. (2019) suggests that these may also be affected by parental
attitudes to labor markets. The role of maternity and aging on female earnings is
confirmed by a comparatively recent strand of the literature which focuses on the
labor market behavior of young people to try to ascertain at which stage the gender pay
gap first arises. Many studies have found little or no gender wage gap among young
people. A gap emerges after maternity and widens as workers age. Manning and
Swaffield (2008) provide an early study of this type for the UK. In a study of US
MBAs, Bertrand et al. (2010) attribute a growing gender wage gap that increased with
age to career interruptions as well as differences in training and weekly hours of work.
More recently, similar findings have been noted for several developing countries—see,
for example, Pastore (2010) and Pastore et al. (2016). This study provides recent
evidence for the USA which confirms the existence of much narrower differences in
gender wages for younger than older workers.
Some research has been aimed at locating the gap along the earning distribution to
understand whether it is generalized or whether it is attributable to particular groups of
individuals with specific skill levels. Blau and Kahn (1997) find increased demand for
highly skilled workers to have widened the gender wage gap. In their study covering 11
countries, Arulampalam et al. (2007) find evidence of a tendency for the gender pay gap
to be concentrated mainly among the low-skill (so-called sticky floor effect) and the
high-skill (so-called glass ceiling effect) workers. Examples of the latter include man-
agerial positions, particularly senior management, and many highly paid liberal profes-
sions (Goldin, 2014). In these types of jobs, not only education and human capital are of
importance but also relationships of trust with customers. This makes the role of some
individuals hard to substitute and, in consequence, requires flexibility with respect to
hours of work—conditions that are often not easily met by women. Olivetti (2006)
provides a newmeasure of the returns to work experience, using PSID data for the USA.
Her analysis shows that there has been a convergence in the rate of returns to work
experience by gender, with female returns increasing more rapidly than those of men.
This is attributed to the diffusion of new technologies that favor the skills of women
more than those of men.
Sulis (2012), in a study of Italy, found that search frictions, productivity, and
discrimination all shaped the gender wage gap. Another issue related to maternity is
the prevalence of part-time working by women. Part-time working attracts lower hourly
rates of pay and has often been identified as an important contributor to the gender wage
gap. Blau et al. (2013) found that US policies encouraged women to undertake part-time
work in lower level jobs. Ermisch and Wright (1993) provide evidence that women in
the UK received lower wages in part-time than in full-time work. Moreover, as noted
above, Goldin (2014) emphasizes the role of flexible working times in highly paid
occupations and senior positions. This, in turn, is an argument to support the view that
the preference of women for part-time work might tend to exclude women from such
types of jobs. The role of part-time working in creating gender wage differences is
another focal point of the analysis presented in this study.
Several studies have tried to understand the origins of discrimination and have found
evidence that they are related to the persistence of traditional views regarding the gender
division of roles in society. Fortin (2005) finds perceptions of the role of women in the
home and in society to have a significant effect on the gender wage gap—that anti-
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egalitarian views are associated with a higher gender wage inequality. Pastore and
Tenaglia (2013) find evidence of the role that different religious denominations have in
favoring or hindering female employment—as a consequence of a different degree of
secularization and of views regarding traditional gender roles and the male breadwinner
family model.
Gauchat et al. (2012) examine other potential effects on gender wage inequality in
the USA, such as the effects of globalization, finding that it contributes to a reduced
gender pay gap. Oostendorp (2009) finds evidence that the occupational gender wage
gap tends to decrease with respect to trade and foreign direct investment in richer
countries but found little evidence of any effect in poorer countries. In a study of wages
in India, Menon and Van der Meulen Rodgers (2009) even find the gender wage gap to
increase with respect to openness to international trade.
All of the key themes developed by this paper have been previously considered in
one way or another by the existing literature. At the heart of the gender pay gap is a
sense that women are paid less than men for undertaking essentially the same work.
Matching techniques offer the opportunity to better compare like with like, and such
comparisons are of considerable importance. But the literature makes clear that female
employment is typically not like male employment. For example, gender segregation,
part-time working, parenthood, and unionization are all factors which affect differences
between male and female wages. The contribution of this paper is to provide systematic
and robust evidence on how these factors interact with the core “like for like” gender
pay gap. It finds, for example, that being both a female and a part-time worker results in
a much greater disadvantage in hourly wages than just being female. In so doing, it
implies that the concept of a single gender pay gap is a too simplistic representation of
reality.
3 Data
3.1 Data overview
The study uses two cross-section samples taken from the monthly US Current
Population Survey (CPS), the first for October 2011 to March 2012 and the second
for October 2017 to March 2018. Since both cross-sections comprise different
individuals, it is not possible to formally test for changes between the two periods,
but the intention was to check whether key conclusions change between the two
periods. The full number of observations for the first sample was 907,775 and for the
second 877,776. This sample includes non-responses and individuals who were not
in employment at the time. For much of the analysis, the effective sample was
necessarily limited to those individuals for whom sufficient information to obtain
their usual hourly earnings existed. This amounted to 77,097 individuals for the first
sample and 76,308 for the second. It should also be noted that the Stata software
automatically removes observations for which there are missing values so the actual
number of observations used in any one task may vary from these totals. The first
sample (October 2011 to March 2012) comprised 51.6% females and 48.4% males,
and the second sample (October 2017 to March 2018) had exactly the same
proportions.
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3.2 Sample characteristics
Table 1 provides employment rates of males and females for both samples. Participa-
tion rates for both males and females increased in the six years between the two
samples. In both cases, the proportion of females not in the labor force was about
10% higher than that of males. Lower overall participation rates for females were not
the only key difference from males. In both samples, the proportion of females working
part time was substantially higher than that of males. In the second later sample, this
became more exaggerated with the proportion of females engaged in part-time work
being roughly double compared with that of males.
As Blau and Kahn (2017) note, the existence of gender segregation implies that
industry and occupational differences between male and female employment are impor-
tant contributory factors to gender differences in wages. To assess the extent and evolution
of gender segregation, Table 2 reports gender segregation indices for CPS data over a
much longer period (March 2005 to March 2018) than those used for the rest of the study.
These indices suggest a gradual decline in gender segregation by occupation between
March 2005 and March 2018, but the overall degree of segregation by the end still
remained substantial. For segregation by industry, there is very little evidence of longer
term change. Segregation by industry is lower than that by occupation but still of
Table 1 Employment rates for male and females aged 15 or over
Age group
All 15–24 25–40 41–65
October 2011 to March 2012
Male
Not in labor force 32.92% 50.74% 11.80% 21.69%
Full-time labor force 56.92% 27.99% 79.68% 70.77%
Part-time labor force 10.16% 21.27% 8.52% 7.54%
Female
Not in labor force 42.08% 51.51% 24.82% 30.39%
Full-time labor force 42.58% 22.56% 59.48% 54.83%
Part-time labor force 15.34% 25.94% 15.70% 14.78%
October 2017 to March 2018
Male
Not in labor force 26.49% 55.30% 13.41% 23.50%
Full-time labor force 64.74% 25.84% 78.90% 71.00%
Part-time labor force 7.77% 17.87% 5.61% 5.19%
Female
Not in labor force 35.75% 55.16% 27.18% 34.38%
Full-time labor force 49.28% 21.75% 59.02% 52.70%
Part-time labor force 14.86% 23.01% 13.56% 12.87%
Source: CPS surveys for October 2011 to March 2012 and for October 2017 to March 2018
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consequence. It is worth noting carefully that the values of gender segregation indices are
necessarily affected by how both “occupation” and “industry” are defined. The narrower
the definitions, the more likely one is to observe a greater degree of gender segregation.
These findings are consistent with other studies of gender segregation in US labor
markets. Most notably, Blau et al. (2013) find a value of 51% for occupational segregation
in 2009 compared with about 52% inMarch and September 2009 in this study. The results
are also consistent with the findings of Hegewisch et al. (2010) on occupational segrega-
tion. The findings support the view of Blau and Kahn (2017) that the decline in gender
segregation observed in earlier decades has stalled at levels that still represent a high
degree of occupational segregation. Available existing evidence on segregation by indus-
try is much more limited so providing such evidence is one of the contributions of this
study.
The analysis necessarily used the CPS definitions of both occupation and industry.
Detailed definitions of both industry and occupation were used. Due to changes in
Table 2 Gender segregation in-
dices by occupation and industry
Duncan and Duncan (1955)
indices
Source: Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS)
Month Occupation Industry
Mar-05 0.5335 0.4030
Sep-05 0.5206 0.4053
Mar-06 0.5229 0.4023
Sep-06 0.5269 0.4071
Mar-07 0.5221 0.4004
Sep-07 0.5266 0.4065
Mar-08 0.5388 0.4016
Sep-08 0.5260 0.4091
Mar-09 0.5248 0.4051
Sep-09 0.5187 0.4028
Mar-10 0.5163 0.4034
Sep-10 0.5255 0.3993
Mar-11 0.5172 0.3999
Sep-11 0.5250 0.4037
Mar-12 0.5157 0.3961
Sep-12 0.5170 0.4135
Mar-13 0.5266 0.3972
Sep-13 0.5276 0.4213
Mar-14 0.5219 0.3905
Sep-14 0.5389 0.4201
Mar-15 0.5123 0.3967
Sep-15 0.5219 0.4043
Mar-16 0.5147 0.3994
Sep-16 0.4974 0.3855
Mar-17 0.5016 0.3910
Sep-17 0.5031 0.4078
Mar-18 0.5031 0.4011
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definitions over the period, the precise number of each varied, but there were at least 600
occupation and 250 industry categories included throughout. It is recognized that such
definitions can never be wholly satisfactory and that the results could have been signif-
icantly affected by a different alternative set of definitions.
Another relevant feature of the data is that women exhibited lower rates of unionization
thanmen. In the first sample (October 2011 toMarch 2012), 12.8% ofmales and 11.4% of
females were unionized. In the second sample (October 2017 to March 2018), the
comparable proportions were 11.0% for males and 9.9% for females.
3.3 Variables
Much of the analysis was concerned with the effect of gender on wages. For this, the
outcome (dependent) variable was the lhwage, the log of usual hourly earnings. For
most of the analysis, the key treatment variable was female (0 if male, 1 if female).
The following variables were used mainly as covariates but also served as treatment
variables in some instances:
& parttime, 0 if full time and 1 if part time
& young, 0 if 25 or over and 1 if under 25
& parent, 1 if a parent of a child aged under 18 but 0 if not
& union, 1 if a union member but 0 if not.
The following variables were used as covariates only:
& age
& married, 1 if married but 0 if not
& edyears, number of years of education
& hours, the usual number of weekly hours worked
& exper, expected experience (explained further below)
& migrant, 0 if born in the USA but 1 if not
& regional dummy variables
& dummy variables for race
& occupational dummy variables
& sector dummy variables.
Both the occupational and sector dummies used the standard CPS definitions. It is
recognized that occupations and industries are impossible to define in a wholly
satisfactory way and that variations in these definitions could result in quite results
for these dummy variables.
To calculate expected experience for each individual in the model, a probit
model was used to estimate (separately) the probability of employment at each age
starting at 15 and ending at 65. The role of expected experience (and of gender
differences in the effect of parenthood) as a determinant of the gender pay gap was
first advanced by Polachek (1975). In this paper, the model of expected experience
was of the general form:
P empl ¼ 1jxð Þ ¼ α0 þ α1marriedþ α2parentþ α3migrantþ γDþ u ð1Þ
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where empl is the (0, 1) variable for whether the individual was employed and D
is a vector of regional and race dummy variables.
The marginal effects (probabilities) were then used to calculate the probability that
each individual would have been in employment at each age from 15 to 65. These were
then added together to give the expected experience in years. Given space constraints,
the results are not reported here but are available from the authors on request.
4 Methodology
4.1 Wage decompositions using recentered influence functions
Firpo et al. (2018) offer an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition using
recentered influence functions (RIF). The technique involves two steps, the first of
which is to divide the wage distribution into a composition and structure effect using a
reweighted procedure (where the weights are estimated). The second step estimates
structure and composition effects for each covariate; essentially in a manner similar to
that of Oaxaca-Blinder. The key difference is that, using the method developed by
Firpo et al. (2009) and Fortin et al. (2011), the dependent variable of the regression is
replaced by the appropriate RIF. To implement this procedure, we used the oaxaca_rif
routine in Stata.
Authors using different data sets than those of this study have used Oaxaca RIF
decompositions to estimate the gender pay gap. Some of these, such as
Kassenboehmer and Sinning (2014) and Töpfer (2017), found a high proportion
of unexplained gender differences which they attributed to heterogeneity in their
data. Wage decompositions were not a focus of this study. Our main purpose in
producing such estimates was to demonstrate that similar problems existed with
the two data sets used for this study. The evidence that similar issues exist with the
CPS data is intended to support the use of matching estimators in this study. A
summary of the results of the Oaxaca RIF analysis is presented in the Appendix.
More detailed results are available from the authors on request. The interpretation
of the results needs some care. In particular, the “unexplained” component is open
to misinterpretation and differing points of view. Further details are not provided
here since this study argues that a different methodological approach is more
suited to its topic.
4.2 Matching with a single treatment variable
The existing empirical literature emphasizes the need to compare like with like with
respect to gender pay differences. Some authors, including Ñopo (2008) and Frölich
(2007), have advocated the use of matching estimators for this purpose. Both authors
propose these techniques as an alternative to the decompositions of the type pro-
posed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). For example, Ñopo (2008) argues that
matching addresses the “out of support” problem inherent in Blinder-Oaxaca wage
decomposition models. Section 4.1 above argued that a more modern version of
wage decompositions using RIF is still subject to heterogeneity issues. Matching
approaches are well equipped to deal with heterogeneity issues. In addition, the heart
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of the matching approach (the selection of a carefully matched control group) has
considerable intuitive appeal in any attempt to compare like with like.
A matching approach starts by defining an outcome variable (log of hourly earnings)
and a (0, 1) treatment variable (female). It seeks to establish whether a statistically
significant difference exists in the log of hourly earnings between the treated (female)
group and the untreated (male) group. The procedure selects a control group from the
untreated (male) group which is selected to be, as far as possible, identical in all other
relevant observable characteristics to the treated (female) group.
A key issue for all matching techniques is the “missing data” problem. For example, the
treatment variable (say being female) is observed, but, to compare male and female wages
accurately, we would need to knowwhat would have happened if the same individual had
been born male. This clearly cannot be observed, and the “missing data” problem is how
best to replicate it from an appropriate counterfactual.With a single treatment variable, this
means selecting an appropriate control group.
This study uses three different approaches to the selection of the control group. These
are propensity score (PS) matching (using kernel density matching), matching by
Mahalanobis distance, and coarsened exact matching (CEM). Given the widespread
use of the first twomatching techniques in the literature, no further explanation is offered
here. The CEM technique is a more recent addition to the matching toolbox: see Iacus
et al. (2012). For matching by both propensity score and by Mahalanobis distance, the
treated group is not changed and the only “matching” occurs in the creation of a control
group. With coarsened exact matching, the process excludes all those observations from
the treated group for which a nearly exact match on all covariates cannot be found. CEM
sets a maximum difference in the covariates between the treated and untreated groups
and removes observations from both groups where no nearly exact match exists. In
many respects, this makes it a more rigorous attempt to compare like with like, but,
unlike the other approaches, it results in sample size reductions.
Neither PS nor Mahalanobis matching techniques remove those observations from
the treated group that are “difficult” to match closely. In consequence, an issue arises of
how closely the control group matches the treated group (sometimes referred to as “bias
on observables”). For each analysis using both techniques, the match between the two
groups was checked using the psmatch2 routine in Stata. The resulting graphs are
reported in the separate appendices available from https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/331703104_Meara_Pastore_Webster_specification_checks.
A further more intractable problem is the risk of bias on unobservables: an excluded
confounding variable may have biased the results. This study uses a large number of
covariates in the treatment model in an attempt to reduce this risk (see Section 3).
However, as King and Nielsen (2016) have pointed out, doing this can create a risk of a
different form of bias: from matching on irrelevant variables. To limit that risk, all
covariates included in the probit (treatment) model were first tested for statistical signif-
icance in a regression model with the outcome as the dependent variable. These regres-
sions are not reported but details are available from the authors on request.
The approach taken in this study reflects conceptual as well as statistical issues.
For matching estimators to be unbiased, they need to include all relevant observ-
ables. This means that in estimating the gender pay gap, the technique should control
for other covariates that are known to also affect the difference in gender wages.
These include the effects of gender segregation, part-time working, unionization,
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and parenthood. It is, of course, central to the study to estimate the gender wage gap
on as close to a “like for like” basis as possible. However, it is also important to
recognize that this is an estimate of the direct consequence of gender on wages and
that there are other less direct mechanisms that affect gender wages. The approach of
this study is to identify how the gender pay gap changes when these “indirect”
effects of being female are taken into account.
The CPS data reveal, as expected, that part-time working is more common
among females than males and that females are less unionized. The study first uses
matching to show that, with the CPS data, there existed a union wage premium
and an hourly wage discount for working part time. Next, the study estimated the
core (like for like) gender pay gap for both samples. This is estimated firstly with
industry and occupation dummies. It was then re-estimated without these dummy
variables to identify the effect of gender segregation on the gender pay gap. For
the remainder of the matching analysis, the sample was sub-divided into two
according to one of the key covariates. These were used to show how the gender
pay gap varies between one group and another. For example, the sample was
divided into young (under 25) and older workers and the gender pay gap estimated
for each. A similar approach was taken for part-time working, union membership,
and parenthood. These provided a key insight into how each of these variables
influences differences in gender wages.
4.3 Matching with inverse probability weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA)
The IPWRA estimator derived by Cattaneo (2010) and Cattaneo et al. (2013) differs
from most matching estimators in that it estimates both a treatment model and an
outcome model. The treatment model is similar to most matching models. It estimates
the probability of the treatment variable (female in this case) being associated with each
of a number of characteristics. Manymatchingmodels use probit for this purpose. In this
study, the IPWRA treatment model used a logit model.
The treatment model gives the probability of, say, observing a female given that one
observes a part-time worker. That is, the treatment model is used to assign a sampling
probability for each observation. The inverse of this probability is then used toweight each
observation in the outcome models. The inverse probabilities are used to address the
“missing data” problem. Using these inverse probabilities, in essence, creates a counter-
factual to address the missing data issue. The technique next estimates a number of
(inverse probability) weighted regression outcome models, one for each treatment level.
Each of these produces a series of treatment-specific predicted outcomes, one for each
treatment level. The means of these predicted outcomes are then used to estimate the
treatment effect.
The IPWRA estimator can be shown to have some important statistical properties.
The most important of these is the property of “double robustness”: see Cattaneo
(2010) and Cattaneo et al. (2013). That is, if either the treatment model or the outcome
model is incorrectly specified but the other is correctly specified, then the estimates are
still consistent. This means that it is only necessary for one of the two to be correctly
specified for the estimator to be consistent. As a corollary, it is necessary to assume that
at least one of the treatment or outcome models does not exclude a confounding
variable.
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Hirano et al. (2003) have shown that doubly robust estimators (which include
IPWRA) exhibit a lower bias than estimators without the double robustness property.
Another common problem with matching models is mis-matching on irrelevant
variables. King and Nielsen (2016) point out that IPWRA estimators are less prone
to mis-matching on irrelevant observables.
From the perspective of this paper, the reasons for using the IPWRA are not just for
the desirable statistical properties of the estimator but also for the questions that it can
address. The model is specified to work with a number of discrete treatment levels. This
means that it can be adapted to work with more than one treatment variable. For
example, suppose that that we have two (0, 1) treatment variables: female and parttime.
This can be adapted into four treatment levels:
& Treatment level 0: female = 0 and parttime = 0
& Treatment level 1: female = 1 and parttime = 0
& Treatment level 2: female = 0 and parttime = 1
& Treatment level 3: female = 1 and parttime = 1
In this way, it is possible to use the IPWRA to estimate both treatment effects separately
and to estimate their joint (interaction) effect when both apply. It is this feature that
makes it particularly useful for analyzing the interaction between gender and other
related influences such as part-time working, unionization, and parenthood.
In this study, the outcome variable for all IPWRA models was the log of hourly
wages. For both the treatment and outcome models, the full set of covariates listed in
the preceding section was used. An important assumption of the IPWRA model is
known as the overlap assumption. This means that every individual must have a
positive probability of receiving each treatment level. For example, it must be possible
that union members can be male and can be female. If unions excluded all males or all
females, the overlap assumption would be violated. Stata produces graphical checks for
the overlap assumption. These are not reported for the IPWRA models in Section 6 but
are available in separate appendices available from https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/331703104_Meara_Pastore_Webster_specification_checks.
Finally, as with other matching models, the IPWRA analysis assumes that treatments
and outcomes are statistically independent (conditional mean independence).
4.4 Interpretation of results
For both the single treatment and the IPWRA matching analysis, the outcome
variable is the log of hourly wages. Consequently, the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT) is the difference in the log of wages between, say, females and
males. This is often interpreted as the percentage difference in wages. However, the
difference in logs is only a linear approximation (by means of a Taylor expansion) of
the true percentage difference. This approximation (as can be seen in our results) is
only accurate when the difference between the two sets of wages is small. Since the
precise percentage difference can readily be derived from the matching output, this is
reported together with the relevant ATT throughout this paper, except for the CEM
analysis (for which the ATT is estimated differently and correctly reflects the exact
percentage difference).
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5 Matching analysis with a single treatment variable
5.1 Treatment effects of part-time working and union membership
This section provides a supporting analysis for work to follow on the gender pay gap.
Earlier analysis of the CPS data (Section 3) has shown that women are less likely than
men to be unionized but more likely to be working part time. The purpose of this
analysis is to demonstrate that, with the CPS data, both union membership and part-
time working have significant effects on wages in their own right.
Table 3 presents matching estimates of the reduction in hourly wages from working
part time and the wage premium from being a unionmember. These are for the full sample
and made use of the full set of covariates listed in Section 4 earlier, including industry,
occupation, race, and region dummies. Results are for propensity score (kernel density)
matching and use a second set of estimates (frommatching byMahalanobis distance) as a
robustness check. Since this is a supporting analysis, we do not also provide a set of CEM
estimates (as is done with later analysis) in the interests of being concise.
Table 3 shows a statistically significant premium for union membership according to
the PSmatching estimator. The results (statistically significant at 99% confidence) imply a
unionwage premium of about 14% for our first sample and about 13% for the second. The
Mahalanobis estimates for the first sample are comparable with those of the PS estimator
for the first sample (a premium of about 14%) but slightly lower for the second sample (a
premium of about 11%). Both estimators support a substantial and statistically significant
union wage premium in each sample.
For part-time working, our results consistently show a substantial and statistically
significantly lower hourly wage than for full-time working. Propensity score estimates
for both our samples are comparable: a part-time discount of about 19% in October 2011
to March 2012 and of about 21% in October 2017 to March 2018. Estimates for matching
by Mahalanobis distance are again comparable across the two samples—discounts of
about 14% and 16%—but are somewhat lower than those for the propensity score
estimator. Nonetheless, both estimators support a conclusion that a substantial disadvan-
tage in hourly wages exists from working on a part-time basis.
This study reported earlier that, for our samples from the US CPS data, women were
more likely to work part time and less likely to be unionized. The analysis in this section
has shown that, for the same data, both characteristics would contribute to an overall
difference betweenmale and female wages that goes beyond the impact of the direct effect
of gender alone. This is a key point to be explored further in this study. It implies that a
“like for like” comparison of the direct effect of gender on wages is not the only effect that
merits consideration.
5.2 Treatment effects of gender
This section focuses on matching estimates for the gender pay gap in the US using both
our samples. As discussed earlier, it is important that thematching processmakes use of all
relevant observed covariates. Not to do so would expose the estimates to an increased risk
of bias on unobservables. The resulting estimate is, in consequence, an estimate of the
effect on wages of being female with the effects of all other observed covariates controlled
by thematching process. Such estimates are unquestionably useful but give rise to two sets
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of concerns. These are not really statistical but are important for our understanding of
gender wage differences. Firstly, we know from the literature that gender wage differences
can vary by, for example, age group and that gender segregation affects gender wage
differences. It is important to understand these factors. Secondly, the process of matching
Table 3 Effects of part-time working and union membership on wages
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat Observations
Untreated Treated
(a) Sample: October 2011–March 2012
Propensity score matching (kernel density, bootstrapped standard errors)
(a) Part-time working % pay gap − 19.2%
Unmatched 2.4650 2.9429 − 0.4779 0.0055 − 86.35 63,049 14,048
Matched 2.4650 2.6784 − 0.2134*** 0.0064 − 33.36
(b) Union membership % pay gap 13.6%
Unmatched 3.0657 2.8269 0.2388 0.0068 35.12 67,750 9347
Matched 3.0657 2.9380 0.1277*** 0.0067 19.12
Mahalanobis matching
(a) Part-time working % pay gap − 14.2%
Unmatched 2.4650 2.9429 − 0.4779 0.0055 − 86.35 63,049 14,048
Matched 2.4650 2.6179 − 0.1529*** 0.0103 − 14.85
(b) Union membership % pay gap 12.9%
Unmatched 3.0657 2.8269 0.2388 0.0068 35.12 67,750 9347
Matched 3.0657 2.9445 0.1212*** 0.0099 12.2
(b) Sample: October 2017–March 2018
Propensity score matching (kernel density, bootstrapped standard errors)
(a) Part-time working % pay gap − 20.9%
Unmatched 2.5870 3.0678 − 0.4808 0.0058 − 83.04 63,834 12,474
Matched 2.5870 2.8217 − 0.2347*** 0.0067 − 34.8
(b) Union Membership % pay gap 13.0%
Unmatched 3.1847 2.9664 0.2183 0.0073 30.06 68,324 7,984
Matched 3.1847 3.0626 0.1220*** 0.0070 17.51
Mahalanobis matching
(a) Part-time working % pay gap − 16.4%
Unmatched 2.5870 3.0678 − 0.4808 0.0058 − 83.04 63,834 12,474
Matched 2.5870 2.7663 − 0.1793*** 0.0108 − 16.58
(b) Union membership % pay gap 11.4%
Unmatched 3.1847 2.9664 0.2183 0.0073 30.06 68,324 7984
Matched 3.1847 3.0771 0.1076*** 0.0102 10.5
Estimated treatment effects and percentage pay gaps are in italic type. Outcome = log of hourly wage
***Statistically significant at 99%
**Statistically significant at 95%
*Statistically significant at 90%
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selects controls (males) which are similar in terms of, say, parenthood, part-time working,
or unionmembership. All of these can affect gender wage differences. In short, there needs
to be an estimate of the effect of gender on wages where, as far as possible, like is
compared with like. But in so doing, it is important not to neglect other more indirect
routes by which gender wage differences occur.
In this section we start by estimating the gender pay gap for both our samples. Themain
estimate of the gender pay pap quite properly controls for the effect on wages of the
concentration of women in lower paid occupations or industries (gender segregation). To
identify the effects of gender segregation, we repeat the analysis but without industry or
sector dummy variables. Next, we consider the effect of age on the gender wage
differences by applying our matching estimates to two sub-samples—young (under 25)
and older. Since part-time working results in lower hourly wages (see the preceding
section), we then estimate separate gender wage gaps for part-time and full-time workers.
Separate gender pay gaps are then estimated for parents and non-parents and for union
members and non-members. The purpose of all of these is to provide a much richer
analysis and interpretation than just the direct effect of gender on wages.
Table 4 reports the results of this analysis using propensity score (PS) matching (kernel
density), Table 5 repeats the analysis for matching by Mahalanobis distance, and Table 6
also repeats the analysis using coarsened exact matching (CEM). The PSmatching (Table 4)
is included since it is the most widely understood matching technique. Matching by
Mahalanobis distance (Table 5) and matching by the CEM technique (Table 6) are both
included as robustness checks on the findings of the PS matching analysis.
The PS matching analysis (Table 4) produced an estimate of a statistically significant
gender pay gap of about 13% for the October 2011 to March 2012 sample and of about
12% for the October 2017 to March 2018 sample. Comparable estimates using (a)
Mahalanobis distance (Table 5) and (b) CEM (Table 6) were (a) 13% and 10.5% and
(b) 12% and 14%. In all cases, these estimates were statistically significant at 99%
confidence. These estimates represent the gender pay gap resulting from the direct effect
of being female. That is, the secondary effects of, for example, part-time working,
parenthood, or union membership are included in the controls and not in the estimate.
Table 4 shows the effect of taking into account gender segregation bymeans of industry
and occupation dummy variables. Removing these industry and occupation dummies
increased the estimate of the gender pay gap to 15% for the first sample and to 16% for the
second. A comparable effect was observed with both the Mahalanobis and CEM estima-
tors (Tables 5 and 6). Interpretation of these findings is important. It is not necessary to
choose between estimates with industry and occupation dummy variables and those
without. Both convey complementary information. To the extent to which the matching
was successful in comparing like with like, the estimates for, say, the second sample
showed that being female involved hourly wages that were typically 13% less than those
for males. Since this estimate controls for differences in industry and occupation, it does
not take into account gender segregation. When we allow for the effects of females being
more concentrated in lower paid industries and occupations, the comparable estimate is a
pay gap of 17%. As with Blau and Kahn (2017), this supports the conclusion that gender
segregation by industry and by occupation is important in understanding gender wage
differences.
The next sub-division of the sample was between young (under 25) and older.
Previous studies have found the gender pay gap to be smaller or even non-existent for
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younger workers. With the PS matching (Table 4), this study finds a small but statisti-
cally significant gender pay gap for young individuals, of about 2% in our first sample
and about 3% in the second. Both the Mahalanobis distance matching (Table 5) and the
CEM (Table 6) analysis found no statistically significant gender pay differences (at 95%
Table 6 Coarsened exact matching (CEM) results
ATT S.E. T-stat P > t Observations
Sample: October 2011–March 2012
Full sample
(a) With industry and occupation dummies − 0.1211*** 0.0091 − 13.34 0.0000 18644
(b) Without industry and occupation dummies − 0.1480*** 0.0050 − 29.43 0.0000 57060
Sample divided by the age group
(a) Young (24 or under) 0.0019 0.0186 0.10 0.9190 2413
(b) Older (25 or over) − 0.1553*** 0.0093 − 16.78 0.0000 14165
Sample divided by part time and full time
(a) Part time 0.03742* 0.0230 1.62 0.1040 1780
(b) Full time − 0.1362*** 0.0092 − 14.75 0.0000 16001
Sample divided by parenthood
(a) Parents − 0.1537*** 0.0151 − 10.15 0.0000 5566
(b) Non-parents − 0.1013*** 0.0111 − 9.14 0.0000 12945
Sample divided by union membership
(a) Union members − 0.0926*** 0.0222 − 4.17 0.0000 1839
(b) Union non-members − 0.1265*** 0.0095 − 13.27 0.0000 17097
Sample: October 2017–March 2018
Full sample
(a) With industry and occupation dummies − 0.1362*** 0.0087 − 15.59 0.0000 19692
(b) Without industry and occupation dummies − 0.1752*** 0.0050 − 35.14 0.0000 58291
Sample divided by the age group
(a) Young (24 or under) − 0.0176 0.0208 − 0.84 0.3980 1936
(b) Older (25 or over) − 0.1629*** 0.0093 − 17.48 0.0000 15125
Sample divided by part time and full time
(a) Part time − 0.0337 0.0254 − 1.33 0.1840 1612
(b) Full time − 0.1486*** 0.0092 − 16.21 0.0000 16167
Sample divided by parenthood
(a) Parents − 0.1768*** 0.0148 − 11.95 0.0000 5697
(b) Non-parents − 0.1161*** 0.0109 − 10.70 0.0000 13131
Sample divided by union membership
(a) Union members − 0.1128*** 0.0260 − 4.33 0.0000 1271
(b) Union non-members − 0.1378*** 0.0091 − 15.18 0.0000 18537
Estimated treatment effects are in italic type. Outcome variable = log of hourly wages
***Statistically significant at 99%
**Statistically significant at 95%
*Statistically significant at 90%
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confidence) for young workers. These findings contrast sharply for the estimates of the
gender pay gap for older workers. For each of the three estimators, these were statisti-
cally significant and substantially higher than those for young workers. The PSmatching
estimates (Table 4) imply a gender pay gap of about 13% for older workers in the first
sample and of about 14% in the second sample. Mahalanobis distance (Table 5) and
CEM (Table 6) yield similar results. The sharp difference in the gender pay gap between
young and older workers has some obvious potential implications for the role of
marriage and parenthood in gender pay differences. These are discussed further later.
Sub-dividing the sample by part-time and full-time workers produces some further
interesting findings. The PS matching analysis (Table 4) suggests a statistically significant
but small gender pay gap for part-time workers. For this first sample, this was estimated at
3% and, for the second sample, 6%. Both Mahalanobis and CEM techniques (Tables 5 and
6) found no statistically significant (at 95%) gender pay difference betweenmale and female
part-time workers. The gender pay gap for full-time workers estimated by PS matching
(Table 4) was statistically significant and substantial for both samples—14% for the first
sample and 15% for the second. Both Mahalanobis and CEM techniques produced similar
estimates (Tables 5 and 6). The finding of no statistically significant gender difference in the
hourly wages of part-timeworkers is of consequence. Evidence presented earlier shows both
that a higher proportion of females than males work part time and that part-time working
involves its own gap in hourly pay relative to full time. That there is little or no gender pay
difference between male and female part-time workers implies that the interaction between
gender and part-time effects is of importance. That is, the role of part-time working in the
gender pay gap is more through the pay disadvantage of part-time working than any
significant gender wage difference between part-time workers. This is further analyzed in
the next section.
The division of both samples by parenthood finds a statistically significant gender pay
gap for both parents (of children under 18) and for non-parents in both samples, according to
all three of the matching estimators used. In every case, the estimated wage gap for parents
was substantially greater than that for non-parents. For example, the estimated wage gap for
parents using PS matching was about 17% in the first sample and about 18% in the second
sample. The comparable estimates for non-parents were 10% and 12%. These findings
complement those with respect to age, which imply changes in the gender pay gap at ages
consistent with parenthood. They also complement the existing literature which finds a role
for parenthood affecting the gender pay gap, not least through its impact on experience and
human capital. Again, the role of parenthood is further analyzed in the next section.
The last sub-division of the samples was with respect to union membership.
Again all three matching estimators find a statistically significant gender pay gap
for both samples and for both union and non-union members. In almost all cases, the
estimated gender pay gap for union members is greater than that for non-members.
With PS matching, the gender pay gap for union members in the first sample was
estimated at about 12% and for non-members at 11%. For the second sample, the
comparable estimates were 16% and 13%. These findings imply a contradictory
effect of union membership on gender wages. Union membership, as shown earlier,
involves a wage premium which, given low female unionization, should widen the
gender pay gap. In contrast, the gender pay gap not only exists between male and
female union members but also is higher than that for those who are not unionized.
This implies that to fully understand the net overall effect of the interaction between
K. Meara et al.292
unionization and gender on pay, further analysis is needed. This is provided in the
next section.
6 IPWRA analysis for the full sample
6.1 With gender and part-time working as treatments
Table 7 presents the results of the IPWRA analysis with both female and parttime as
treatment variables. The two treatment variables were combined to produce the fol-
lowing composite treatment levels:
& Treatment level 0—male full time (female = 0 and parttime = 0)
& Treatment level 1—female full time (female = 1 and parttime = 0)
& Treatment level 2—male part time (female = 0 and parttime = 1)
& Treatment level 3—both female and part time (female = 1 and parttime = 1)
The results are divided into two parts—absolute and relative treatment effects.
Absolute effects are the treatment effects where the control group is treatment level 0
(comparable male full-time workers). Relative effects compare the other (non-zero)
treatment levels with each other. In particular, treatment effects were estimated for:
(a) Treatment level 1 (female full time) relative to treatment level 2 (male part time)
(b) Treatment level 1 (female full time) relative to treatment level 3 (female part time)
(c) Treatment level 2 (male part time) relative to treatment level 3 (female part time).
In a similar manner to the earlier matching analysis, the full set of variables listed in
Section 4 was used to construct the relevant treatment and outcome models in each case.
The absolute effects presented in Table 7 produce some interesting findings. Firstly, the
gender pay gap between male and female full-time workers was 14% in both the earlier
and later of the two samples. These are values consistent with the earlier matching
analysis. Secondly, the analysis confirms a substantial gap in hourly pay rates between
part-time and full-time workers. The gap in hourly pay between full-time and part-time
males was about 24% in both samples. This confirms the earlier findings that part-time
working involves a substantial disadvantage in hourly pay rates relative to full-time
working. Lastly, the (separate) pay gaps for being female and for working part time re-
enforce each other when it comes to the pay gap between part-time women and full-time
men. For the earlier sample, this estimated gap in pay was about 27% and for the later
sample approximately 28%. This provides clear evidence that the prevalence of part-time
working is an important mechanism by which the “like for like” gender pay gap is
worsened. That is, it shows that the wage disadvantage of being female is substantially
worsened when the prevalence of female part-time working is taken into account.
For the relative effects, female part-time working was found to result in substantially
lower hourly wages comparedwith all female workers. This gapwas found to be about 15%
in the earlier sample and 16.5% in the later one. This provides evidence that the gap between
part-time and full-time rates exists for females aswell as formales. Female part-timeworkers
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were also found to have statistically significantly lower hourly wages than comparable part-
time workers of both genders. However, the gender pay gap among part-time workers was
comparatively modest—about 3% in both samples. Finally, part-time males were found to
have substantially lower wages than females (both part and full time). This implies that the
wage disadvantage of working part time is larger than the disadvantage from being female.
This finding emphasizes the importance of including the wage disadvantages of part-time
working within the understanding of gender wage differences.
The outcome of the IPWRA analysis of gender and part-time working performs two
key functions. Firstly, it shows that the disadvantages of working part time and the
prevalence of part-time working among females are both relevant and important for
understanding gender wage differences. Secondly, it provides a robustness check onmany
of the earlier findings of the matching analysis. Since there are also no substantial
behavioral differences between the two different time periods, the main findings are not
just robust with respect to choice of estimator but also robust with respect to the choice
between the two cross-sections.
6.2 With gender and union membership as treatments
Table 8 presents the results of the IPWRA analysis using both gender and unionization
as treatments. The following composite treatment levels were used:
& Treatment level 0—male non-union (female = 0 and union = 0)
& Treatment level 1—female non-union (female = 1 and union = 0)
& Treatment level 2—male union (female = 0 and union = 1)
& Treatment level 3—both female and union (female = 1 and union = 1)
In this case, the absolute effects are the treatment effects in relation to the control
group of non-union males (treatment level 0).
Relative effects compare:
(a) Treatment level 1 (female non-union) with treatment level 2 (male union)
(b) Treatment level 1 (female non-union) with treatment level 3 (female union)
(c) Treatment level 2 (male union) with treatment level 3 (female union).
As before, the full set of variables listed in Section 4 was used to construct the relevant
treatment and outcomemodels. These included industry and occupation dummy variables.
Table 8 finds a gender pay gap between non-unionized females and non-unionized
males of about 14% in the earlier sample and around 15% in the later one. Again this is
consistent with the preceding estimates of the “like for like” gender pay gap. The results
also provide evidence of a substantial union wage premium. Male workers benefited from
a union wage premium of approximately 18% in the October 2011 to March 2012 sample
and of about 17% in the October 2017 to March 2018 sample. Relative to non-unionized
males, the effect of female union membership was to reduce the gender pay gap to about
8% in the earlier sample and about 10% in the later sample. That is, the existence of a
union wage premium helps to reduce the overall pay gap for females but does not
eliminate it.
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The relative treatment effects also produce some interesting and relevant findings. One of
these is that there exists a gender pay gap within unionized labor. In the earlier sample,
female unionmemberswere typically paid about 13% less than comparablemales and in the
later sample about 16% less. For women, as with men, the results show a union wage
premium but this is smaller than that for males. The estimated female wage premium was
8.5% in the earlier sample and about 6% in the later one, both less than one half of the male
union wage premium. The estimated gender pay gap between non-unionized females and
unionized males is in the order of 40% for both samples.
As with part-time working, the IPWRA analysis shows that a strict “like for like”
comparison between male and female wages ignores another indirect mechanism by
which female wages are disadvantaged. For both male and female workers, there is a
union wage premium, although the premium for women is lower. That females are less
likely to be unionized also means that any given union wage premium does less to
reduce the overall difference in gender wages. A combination of union premium and
gender wage gap leads to very large differences in hourly pay rates between non-
unionized females and unionized males.
6.3 With gender and parenthood as treatments
This analysis considers composite treatments derived from the two (0, 1) treatment
variables female and parent. The following composite treatment levels were used:
& Treatment level 0—male non-parent (female = 0 and parent = 0)
& Treatment level 1—female non-parent (female = 1 and parent = 0)
& Treatment level 2—male parent (female = 0 and parent = 1)
& Treatment level 3—both female and parent (female = 1 and parent = 1)
Absolute treatment effects were in comparison to the control group of treatment level 0
(male non-parents).
Relative effects compare:
(a) Treatment level 1 (female non-parent) with treatment level 3 (female parent)
(b) Treatment level 1 (female non-parent) with treatment level 2 (female parent)
(c) Treatment level 2 (male parent) with treatment level 3 (female parent).
Table 9 presents the results of this analysis. For non-parents, the core (“like for like”)
gender pay gap was statistically significant in both the October 2011 to March 2012
and the October 2017 to March 2018 samples (about 10% in the first sample and about
11% in the second). The effect of being a male parent (relative to comparable male non-
parents) was estimated to result in a statistically significant wage premium of about 8%
in the first sample and about 3% in the second. The (absolute) effect of being both
female and a parent implies a wage disadvantage of about 5% compared with male non-
parents in the first sample and about 11% in the second.
The relative effects are of particular interest. For females, as with males, the results
suggest that a statistically significant wage premium exists for parents in relation to non-
parents. This premium was estimated at just under 4% for both samples. Within the sub-
sample of all parents, the results show a substantial wage disadvantage from being a
The gender pay gap in the USA: a matching study 297
Ta
bl
e
9
IP
W
R
A
an
al
ys
is
w
ith
fe
m
al
e
an
d
pa
re
nt
ho
od
as
tr
ea
tm
en
ts
Sa
m
pl
e
A
bs
ol
ut
e
ef
fe
ct
s
Fe
m
al
e
no
n-
pa
re
nt
M
al
e
pa
re
nt
Fe
m
al
e
pa
re
nt
O
ct
ob
er
20
11
to
M
ar
ch
20
12
A
T
T
−
0.
10
44
07
1*
**
0.
07
86
84
5*
**
−
0.
05
34
82
9*
**
St
d
er
ro
r
0.
00
56
82
3
0.
00
85
74
3
0.
00
92
27
7
%
pa
y
ga
p
−
9.
9%
8.
2%
−
5.
2%
O
ct
ob
er
20
17
to
M
ar
ch
20
18
A
T
T
−
0.
11
50
08
8*
**
0.
03
12
19
7*
*
−
0.
11
29
91
6*
**
St
d
er
ro
r
0.
00
58
24
2
0.
01
36
28
8
0.
01
81
98
3
%
pa
y
ga
p
−
10
.9
%
3.
2%
−
10
.7
%
R
el
at
iv
e
ef
fe
ct
s
M
al
e
pa
re
nt
vs
.a
ll
fe
m
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
pa
re
nt
vs
.f
em
al
e
no
n-
pa
re
nt
Fe
m
al
e
pa
re
nt
vs
.m
al
e
pa
re
nt
O
ct
ob
er
20
11
to
M
ar
ch
20
12
A
T
T
0.
21
61
41
**
*
0.
03
66
41
3*
**
−
0.
15
28
64
7*
**
St
d
er
ro
r
0.
01
87
26
9
0.
00
69
99
6
0.
01
00
49
1
%
pa
y
ga
p
24
.1
%
3.
7%
−
14
.2
%
O
ct
ob
er
20
17
to
M
ar
ch
20
18
A
T
T
0.
24
11
88
5*
**
0.
03
68
08
3*
**
−
0.
15
93
30
9*
**
St
d
er
ro
r
0.
02
89
68
9
0.
01
16
05
9
0.
01
14
09
6
%
pa
y
ga
p
27
.3
%
3.
7%
−
14
.7
%
A
bs
ol
ut
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
ef
fe
ct
s
ar
e
in
re
la
tio
n
to
th
e
co
nt
ro
l
gr
ou
p
of
m
al
e
no
n-
pa
re
nt
s
**
*S
ta
tis
tic
al
ly
si
gn
if
ic
an
t
at
99
%
**
St
at
is
tic
al
ly
si
gn
if
ic
an
t
at
95
%
*S
ta
tis
tic
al
ly
si
gn
if
ic
an
t
at
90
%
K. Meara et al.298
female parent (in relation to male parents). This disadvantage was estimated at 14.2% for
the first sample and 14.7% for the second. Lastly, the results suggest that the effect of
parenthood is to widen the gender pay gap. The estimated treatment effect (in relation to all
females) of being a male parent implied a gender wage gap of about 22% in the October
2011 toMarch 2012 sample and of about 24% in the October 2017 toMarch 2018 sample.
The finding that parenthood is a further source of wage disadvantage for females is,
perhaps, not surprising but important to be supported with evidence. These findings do,
however, need careful interpretation. The data include only those females in employment
at the time of the relevant surveys. The CPS data identifies parents of children under 18
years at the time of survey. This means that they are not capable of incorporating past
adverse effects on human capital for those parents whose offspring are now adults. Despite
these limitations, the analysis offers evidence which supports the existing literature which
emphasizes the role of female parenthood in understanding the gender pay gap.
6.4 With gender and youth as treatments
Table 10 presents the IPWRA analysis which considers composite treatments derived
from the treatment variables female and youth (defined as age under 25). The following
composite treatment levels were defined:
& Treatment level 0—older male (female = 0 and youth = 0)
& Treatment level 1—older female (female = 1 and youth = 0)
& Treatment level 2—young male (female = 0 and youth = 1)
& Treatment level 3—young female (female = 1 and youth = 1)
Absolute treatment effects were in comparison to the control group of treatment
level 0 (older males).
Relative effects compare:
a) Treatment level 1 (older female) with treatment level 3 (young female)
b) Treatment level 1 (older female) with treatment level 2 (young male)
c) Treatment level 2 (young male) with treatment level 3 (young female).
The results presented in Table 10 imply a gender pay gap for those aged 25 or over of
about 12% in the October 20011 to March 2012 sample and of 12.5% for the October
2017 to March 2018 sample. For those aged under 25 years, there was also a
statistically significant gender pay gap but of much smaller magnitude. For both
samples, this was estimated at approximately 3%.
For males, the effect of being young, unsurprisingly, results in statistically significantly
lower hourly wages compared with being older. For the earlier sample, the gap was
estimated at about 25% and for the later sample at about 22%. For females, the comparable
effect was a gap of about 21% for the earlier sample and around 20% for the later one. Given
that both being young and being female involve lower hourly wages, it is not wholly
surprising that both effects re-enforce each other to create a substantial wage gap between
young females and older males. For the earlier sample, this gap was estimated at about 27%
and for the later sample at just over 25%.
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7 Conclusions
The existing literature on the gender pay gap is extensive and the range of potential causes
very numerous. This study has, for example, only touched on a sub-set of the wide range
of issues covered by Blau and Kahn (2017). However, there remains a scope for formal
statistical analysis. Not all relevant propositions have been tested. Estimations of the
gender pay gap through Oaxaca RIF wage decompositions are still beset with concerns
relating to the unexplained component and heterogeneity within the sample. Matching
estimators provide a stronger basis for controlling for heterogeneity. In a sense, they
provide more reassurance that the “unexplained” gender pay gap is in fact not explained
by observable characteristics such as part-time working or parenthood.
Despite the strengths of a matching approach in controlling for covariates other than
gender, it is too easy to overlook that some of these are also relevant to understanding
gender wage differences. Part of the contribution of this study is that it does not ignore
many of the more relevant covariates. It shows that when the concentration of women in
lower paid occupations and industries (gender segregation) are taken into account, then the
gender pay gap increases. It shows that the gap in hourly wages is much smaller for part-
time than for full-time workers and for younger than for older workers and, in some cases,
not even statistically significant.
The main contribution of this study is in looking at how these key mechanisms by
which females are further disadvantaged interact with the gender effect itself. The IPWRA
analysis estimates (for October 2017 toMarch 2018) a gender pay gap of about 15% and a
gap in hourly wages from working part time (compared to full time) of about 27%. For
those individuals who are both a female and a part-time worker, the gap compared with
that for full-time males was estimated at 31%. This shows that part-time working has as
important an effect on gender wage differences as the direct “like for like” gender effect.
The matching analysis also showed the gender pay gap for unionized workers to be higher
than that for non-unionized workers. It also showed that unionized workers of both genders
benefit from a union wage premium. The IPWRA analysis shows that the net effect of union
membership is that female union members face a smaller gender pay gap than other workers.
That is, despite the gender pay gap being greater for unionized females than for non-unionized
females, the existence of the union wage premium means that they face a lower gender pay
gap overall.
This paper used a matching approach to obtain as close as possible a “like for like”
estimate of the gender pay gap and then examined how the gender pay gap changes with
respect to other influences on gender wage differences such as gender segregation, part-
time working, and low female unionization. The extensive literature on gender pay means
that these have all been discussed somewhere previously. The contribution of this paper is
to provide explicit, soundly based estimates of these interactions. This offers a much richer
understanding of the way in which different sources of disadvantage for females interact in
the creation of gender pay differences. In some instances, it implies that it might be better
not to think of a single gender pay gap but of a series of different pay gaps for different
groups.
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